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Recent crises have seen large spikes in asset price risk without dramatic shifts in
fundamentals. We propose an explanation for these risk panics, based on self-
ful￿lling shifts in beliefs about risk, that are driven by a negative link between
the current asset price and risk about the future asset price. This link implies
that risk about the future asset price depends on uncertainty about future risk.
This dynamic mapping of risk into itself gives rise to the possibility of multiple
equilibria and can generate risk panics. In a panic, risk beliefs are coordinated
around a macro fundamental that becomes a sudden focal point of the market.
The magnitude of the panic is larger the weaker this macro fundamental. The
sharp increase in risk leads to a large drop in the asset price, decreased leverage and
reduced market liquidity. While the model is not aimed at modeling the speci￿cs of
any particular ￿nancial crisis, we show that its implications are broadly consistent
with what happened during the 2007-2008 crisis.1 Introduction
Sharp surges in risk are a prominent feature of ￿nancial panics, such as the turmoil
in the Fall of 2008 or the 2010 Eurozone debt crisis. Volatility, as measured by the
VIX index, more than quadrupled in the wake of the Lehman Brothers failure, and
tripled during the debt crisis. Explaining such huge and sudden spikes in risk is
an important challenge for economic theory and the literature has not yet o￿ered
a formal explanation. In this paper we propose a theory for such spikes in risk,
which we refer to as \risk panics". These involve a large and sudden self-ful￿lling
increase in risk, coordinated around a macro fundamental that becomes a sudden
focal point of the market.
The main contribution of this paper is to show how such risk panics can de-
velop in a model where agents have simple mean-variance preferences. In that case
portfolio demand depends on risk associated with the future asset price.1 In equi-
librium the asset price today depends negatively on risk associated with the asset
price tomorrow. There is then a dynamic degree of freedom in the model. Risk is
de￿ned in terms of uncertainty about the asset price tomorrow. The asset price
tomorrow in turn depends on risk perceptions tomorrow. Therefore risk today de-
pends on uncertainty about risk tomorrow. The dependence of risk on uncertainty
about future risk opens up the possibility of dynamic multiple equilibria associated
with the perceived stochastic process of risk.
We ￿nd that beyond a regular fundamental equilibrium where risk is constant
over time, there are equilibria in which the perceived process of risk is time-varying.
In the latter case the perceived risk is tied to the stochastic process of a variable
that can be extrinsic to the model or be a macro fundamental that is part of the
model. We refer to these as respectively sunspot and sunspot-like equilibria.2 In
a sunspot-like equilibrium the fundamental variable plays a dual role. It a￿ects
1Since we take a macroeconomic perspective, we refer to \the asset price" as the price of a
market portfolio of risky stocks rather than the equity price of a particular ￿rm.
2The term \sunspot-like" equilibria was ￿rst coined by Manuelli and Peck (1992). They write:
\There are two ways that random fundamentals can in￿uence economic outcomes. First, random-
ness a￿ects resources which intrinsically a￿ects prices and allocation. Second, the randomness
can endogenously a￿ect expectations or market psychology, thereby leading to excessive volatil-
ity." In the limiting case where fundamental uncertainty goes to zero, sunspot-like equilibria
converge to pure sunspot equilibria.
1the asset price both through its regular role as fundamental (e.g., through asset
payo￿s or wealth) and as a coordination device for beliefs about risk. The latter
role is entirely separate from its fundamental role.
Risk panics are closely related to the presence of sunspot-like equilibria. In ad-
dition to the pure fundamental equilibrium and sunspot-like equilibrium described
above, we consider switching equilibria between a low-risk and a high-risk state,
with shifts driven by a Markov process. A panic is a switch from the low to the
high-risk state. During a panic, a macro variable suddenly becomes a focal point
for shifts in beliefs about risk. The panic is therefore not triggered by a change in
the variable, but by the sudden self-ful￿lling shift in beliefs about risk that is coor-
dinated around the fundamental.3 Moreover, the panic is larger when this variable
is weak at the time of the shift (e.g., the net worth of leveraged institutions is low
or the Greek debt is high).
The paper is related to the broader literature on multiple equilibria with self-
ful￿lling shifts in beliefs. In this literature there is a coordination of beliefs among
agents, such that a common shift in beliefs leads to actions of all agents that
make the change in expectations self-ful￿lling. In terms of asset prices, there are
many applications of this phenomenon for both stock prices and exchange rates.
In particular, there is a large literature with self-ful￿lling speculative attacks on
currencies.4 A key distinction here is that the self-ful￿lling shift in beliefs is not
about the level of the asset price but about the level, and more generally the
process, of risk. This is critical as we wish to explain large spikes in risk.
There is also a small literature in which self-ful￿lling shifts in beliefs about risk
can occur due to an interaction between risk and liquidity. This occurs in limited
participation models such as Pagano (1989), Allen and Gale (1994) and Jeanne
and Rose (2002). When agents believe that risk is high, market participation is
low. This implies low market liquidity, which leads to a large price response to
asset demand shocks and therefore high risk.5 In this paper multiple equilibria are
not associated with an interaction between risk and liquidity, but rather are the
3Our mechanism is thus distinct from a ￿nancial accelerator where a fundamental shock is
ampli￿ed through ￿nancial frictions.
4E.g., see Obstfeld (1986), Aghion et al. (2004), or Burnside et al. (2004).
5This phenomenon is not limited to limited participation models of asset prices. For other
applications see Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) and Walker and Whiteman (2007).
2result of the dynamic nature of the model where risk today depends on uncertainty
about risk tomorrow.6 In contrast to the static limited participation models, in
the model here risk is time-varying in the high risk equilibrium and its process is
closely connected to that of a macro fundamental. This connects more closely to
what we have seen during recent crises.7
We derive our results under the assumption that agents have simple mean-
variance preferences. The mean-variance portfolio model has a long history in
academics and remains extensively used today. It is also widely used in the ￿nancial
industry and can therefore be considered as a reasonable description of actual
behavior.8 An alternative avenue would be to introduce micro founded risk-based
portfolio constraints, such as value-at-risk constraints or margin constraints, so
that asset demand would depend explicitly on uncertainty about the future asset
price.9 This would, however, make the model signi￿cantly more complicated. The
mean-variance portfolio assumption in this paper should then be considered as an
approximation of more complex behavior.
As an illustration of the theory, we consider an application to the ￿nancial
crisis of 2007-2008. We show that an extension of the model, where we introduce
shocks to the wealth of leveraged investors, delivers results that are qualitatively
consistent with what happened during the crisis to stock prices, market liquidity,
stock price risk, the volatility of risk and ￿nancial leverage. Of particular interest
in the context of this paper is that the model can generate a very large sudden
spike in risk.
We want to emphasize though that while our model can account for the broad
patterns observed during the 2008 panic, it is not aimed at modeling the speci￿cs
of any particular ￿nancial crisis. We do not encompass important aspects of the
6The dynamic nature of the multiplicity only arises when the variable around which expecta-
tions are coordinated displays persistence.
7The spike in risk during recent crises was accompanied by a similar spike in the volatility of
risk. Moreover, after the spike in risk the VIX ￿uctuated closely with the variable of concern,
for example any information about a possible bailout package during the Greek debt crisis.
8See Basak and Chabakauri (2009) for further motivation.
9A substantial literature introducing such constraints has developed in recent years. Examples
are Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2010) and Gromb and
Vayanos (2002). For the same reason of analytic tractability as in this paper, these constraints
are often introduced in a reduced-form way rather than based on explicit micro foundations.
3recent crisis, such as a run on wholesale bank deposits (e.g. through repo contracts)
that most observers would consider to be a major aspect of the crisis. Moreover,
every crisis is di￿erent. During the Greek debt crisis in the Spring of 2010, the VIX
more than tripled while there was no bank run at all, and no security complexity
issues and adverse selection problems that characterized the breakdown in liquidity
during the 2008 panic. In our framework there just needs to be some variable, or
set of variables, that becomes a natural focal point of the market, instilling a
signi￿cant level of \fear" that implies a self-ful￿lling increase in perceived risk. In
both of these two recent crises there was clearly such a variable: the health of
leveraged ￿nancial institutions in 2008 and the magnitude of Greek debt in 2010.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop
the possibility of sunspot and sunspot-like equilibria in a simple mean-variance
portfolio model with stochastic asset payo￿s (dividends). We consider both a
simple model with a closed form solution and a more general one. In Section 3 we
show that the model can generate risk panics. Section 4 presents an application
to the 2007-2008 crisis relying on wealth shocks. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Simple Mean-Variance Portfolio Choice Model
Consider a simple mean-variance portfolio choice model where agents buy a stock
and a risk-free bond. We ￿rst consider the case where the return on the bond is
exogenous as this allows us to derive closed-form solutions. We then endogenize
the interest rate in a full general equilibrium setup.
2.1 Model Description
The model complexity is kept to a strict minimum. We consider an overlapping
generation (OLG) setup where investors are born with wealth WI. They invest in
equity and bonds and consume the return on their investment when old. The bond
pays an exogenous constant gross return R. This assumption, which is often made
in the ￿nance literature, allows us to derive a closed form solution. It implicitly
assumes that there is a risk-free technology with a constant real return R that is
in in￿nite supply. This assumption is not crucial to our results and is relaxed in
Section 2.5.
4Equity consists of a claim on a tree with stochastic payo￿. There are K trees,
each producing an exogenous stochastic output (dividend) At. Denoting the equity





Agents face uncertainty both about the dividend and the future equity price.
The dividend is equal to ￿ A(1 + mSt), where St follows an AR process:
St+1 = ￿St + ￿t+1; (2)
￿ 2 h0;1i and the innovation ￿t+1 has a symmetric distribution with mean zero
and variance ￿2. We denote the variance of ￿2
t+1 by !2. St is the only state variable
in the model. When m = 0 the dividend is a constant (At = ￿ A) and St becomes a
pure sunspot. When m > 0, St has a fundamental impact on the equity payo￿.







where ￿ measures risk aversion and the portfolio return is:
R
p
t+1 = ￿tRK;t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)R
￿t denotes the portfolio share invested in equity. The gross returns on equity and
bonds are RK;t+1 and R respectively. The equity market clearing condition is
￿tWI = QtK (4)
The OLG assumption is not critical to the results but simpli￿es the analysis
in two ways. First, it avoids the well-known dynamic hedge term in the optimal
portfolio that arises in multi-period portfolio problems. Second, the wealth level
would be an additional state variable (in addition to St) if agents had in￿nite
lives. We would then be unable to solve the model analytically or even represent
the equilibria graphically. While we cannot get a closed form solution when the
bond interest rate is endogenous, we can still represent the equilibria graphically
as there is only one state variable. A shortcoming of the OLG assumption is that it
prevents movements in asset prices from feeding back into the wealth of investors,
a channel that can be important in a crisis. We introduce such a feedback e￿ect
in the Technical Appendix through a simple extension of the OLG setting, with a
brief discussion in Section 4.4.
52.2 Equilibrium Condition for Equity Price
The maximization of (3) with respect to ￿t gives the optimal portfolio share, which






The portfolio share of equity can exceed one when the equity return is not
very risky, or when investors put little weight on risk. In that case investors are
leveraged, with long positions in equity and short positions in bonds.
Using (5), the market clearing condition (4) becomes:
Et(At+1 + Qt+1 ￿ RQt) =
￿K
WI
vart(Qt+1 + At+1) (6)
Equation (6) equates the equilibrium expected excess payo￿ on equity to a risk
premium that depends on the variance of the payo￿ Qt+1 + At+1. We use it to
solve for the equilibrium asset price Qt as a function of the single state variable St.
2.3 Sunspot Equilibria
First consider the case where m = 0, so that St is a pure sunspot. In that case (6)
can be written as
Qt = ￿0 + ￿1Riskt + ￿2EtQt+1 (7)
where Riskt = vart(Qt+1) measures risk associated with the future asset price and
the parameters are ￿0 = ￿ A=R, ￿1 = ￿￿K=(RWI) and ￿2 = 1=R.
There are two equilibria.10 The ￿rst is a fundamental equilibrium where the












10We only consider stationary equilibria, ruling out rational explosive bubbles.
11An additional restriction to make sure that the asset price is always positive is that the
distribution of ￿t is bounded. In that case St is bounded as well. Then a su￿cient condition for















In the sunspot equilibrium the asset price ￿uctuates with the sunspot St. Risk
is time-varying with the sunspot as well:








The perceived equilibrium process for risk is therefore either a constant or
time-varying and tied to the process for the sunspot St. In order to provide some
intuition for this result, it is useful to consider setting ￿2 = 0 in (7). This sup-
presses, just for the purpose of intuition, the standard dynamic link between the
asset price today and the expected future asset price, a link that is not central to
the mechanism we focus on. We then have
Qt = ￿0 + ￿1Riskt (12)
The same equation forwarded by one period shows that the future asset price
depends on future risk:
Qt+1 = ￿0 + ￿1Riskt+1





Risk therefore depends on uncertainty about future risk itself. It is this dynamic
mapping of risk into itself that opens up the possibility for multiple equilibria.
Clearly, zero risk is an equilibrium. But any process for Riskt is an equilibrium as
long as it satis￿es (13). This process must clearly lead to joint shifts in risk and
uncertainty about risk as they are proportional in (13). One process that satis￿es
(13) is where Riskt is linear in S2
t. Uncertainty about future risk will then depend
on S2
t as well because vart(S2
t+1) = 4￿2￿2S2
t + !2.
An interesting point is that the impact of the sunspot on the equity price is
larger when investors have a low risk aversion ￿ or a large wealth WI. As can be
seen from (6), low risk aversion or large wealth reduce the risk premium and make
it less sensitive to changes in risk. It is precisely because agents respond less to
risk (i.e. are less risk averse) that it is possible to have an equilibrium with large
time-variation in perceived risk.
72.4 Sunspot-Like Equilibria
Next consider the case where m > 0, so that shocks to St are fundamental shocks
to the asset payo￿. We conjecture that the asset price is linear-quadratic in St:
Qt = ~ Q + vSt ￿ V S
2
t (14)
There are again two equilibria: a fundamental one and a sunspot-like one. In
the fundamental equilibrium we have V = 0, v = m￿=(R ￿ ￿), and ~ Q = ( ￿ A +
(￿K=WI)v2￿2)=(R ￿ 1). The asset price is then:




Shocks have a bigger impact on the asset price when they are persistent. Asset
price risk is constant.




























The key parameter here is V . When V is non-zero, as is clearly the case, then









The role of St in coordinating beliefs about risk is entirely separate from its role
as a fundamental. Speci￿cally, V does not depend on m and is thus independent
of the fundamental role of St. The role of St in driving time-varying perceptions
of risk is therefore unrelated to its fundamental role.
We call this equilibrium a sunspot-like equilibrium, and the variable St a
sunspot-like variable, because St has a role similar to that of a sunspot. St clearly
is not a pure sunspot as it a￿ects the Home dividend when m > 0, but its role
in coordinating beliefs about risk is exactly the same as that of a sunspot vari-
able. Although in a very di￿erent context, not involving time-varying shifts in risk,
8Manuelli and Peck (1992) and Spear, Srivastava and Woodford (1990) also present
models with sunspot-like equilibria. Spears, Srivastava and Woodford (1990) point
out that \...a sharp distinction between \sunspot equilibria" and \non-sunspot
equilibria" is of little interest in the case of economies subject to stochastic shocks
to fundamentals." Indeed, as we raise m slightly above 0, the sunspot-like equi-
librium is technically no longer a pure sunspot equilibrium, but it is e￿ectively
indistinguishable.
2.5 Full General Equilibrium
We now move to a full general equilibrium approach by relaxing our assumption
of an exogenous risk-free return R. We introduce an interest-rate elastic supply of
bonds so that investors can reallocate between stocks and bonds in equilibrium.12
We do so by introducing another set of agents, which we call households, who
invest in bonds and in a household technology detailed below.
There are overlapping generations of households born with wealth WH. House-
holds invest their endowment in bonds and a risk-free household technology, and
consume the proceeds when old. Investing KH;t+1 in the household technology at
time t yields an output f(KH;t+1) at t + 1. The technology exhibits decreasing
returns to scale, f0(:) > 0 and f00(:) < 0. Households born at time t maximize
consumption at time t+1, which is equal to f(KH;t+1)+Rt+1(WH ￿KH;t+1) where
Rt+1 is the interest rate on the bond. This choice equalizes the marginal return on
the technology to the bond yield: f0(KH;t+1) = Rt+1.
For convenience we assume a simple quadratic form for household technology.
The capital demand is then linear in the interest rate:13 KH;t+1 = ￿ ￿ ￿Rt+1, and
the demand for bonds by households is:
WH ￿ KH;t+1 = WH ￿ ￿ + ￿Rt+1 (20)
Equation (20) can be positive, in which case households lend bonds to investors,
or negative, in which case they borrow from investors.
12With a constant supply of bonds, the equity price would be entirely pinned down by investors’
wealth and there would be no sunspot or sunspot-like equilibria. There are many ways to
introduce an interest-rate elastic supply or demand schedule of bonds, for example by introducing
interest elastic consumption/savings or investment decisions.






9The bond market clearing condition shows that the demands for bonds by
households and investors add up to zero, as bonds are in zero net supply:
(1 ￿ ￿t)WI + WH ￿ ￿ + ￿Rt+1 = 0
Using the equity market clearing condition (4), we rewrite this as
QtK + ￿ ￿ ￿Rt+1 = W (21)
where W = WI + WH is the aggregate initial wealth. (21) gives a linear positive
relationship between the equity price and the interest rate. A higher equity price
raises the supply of equity. Clearing the equity market then requires investors to
shift their portfolio towards equity and reduce their purchase of bonds (or borrow
more from households). Bond market clearing then requires households to lower
their borrowing (or increase their bond purchase), which they are induced to do
through a higher interest rate.14
Using (21), the equity market clearing condition (6) becomes:
Et
 













vart(Qt+1 + At+1) (22)
The equilibrium condition (22) only involves the equity price, which we again
solve with the method of undetermined coe￿cients. As (22) is non linear in the as-
set price, we no longer have an analytical solution. We therefore adopt a numerical
approximation method along the following lines (details are given in Appendix A).
As is standard in the literature, we consider an approximation of the equilibrium
asset price in logs:
qt = ~ q + vSt ￿ V S
2
t (23)
We then take a quadratic approximation of Qt and Qt+1 around St = St+1 =
0, and use the result to compute the expectation and variance of Qt+1 + At+1.
We substitute the resulting expressions into (22). We ￿nally take a quadratic
approximation around St = 0, which gives a linear-quadratic expression in St:
Z0 + Z1St + Z2S
2
t = 0 (24)
14There is a third market clearing condition, for goods, but we can drop it thanks to Walras’
Law.
10where Z0, Z1, and Z2 are functions of ~ Q = e~ q; v; and V . We solve for the value of
these parameters by setting Z0 = 0, Z1 = 0, and Z2 = 0.
While we are solving for three parameters, ~ Q, v and V , we can represent the
equilibria graphically in a ( ~ Q, v) space. De￿ne ~ V = ~ QV . In Appendix A we show
that Z0 = 0 implies
~ V = ￿1 + ￿2v
2 (25)
where ￿1 and ￿2 are functions of ~ Q. Substituting this into the expressions associ-
ated with Z1 = 0 and Z2 = 0 we obtain
h1 + h2v + h3v
2 + h4v
3 = 0 (26)
g1 + g2v + g3v
2 + g4v
3 + g5v
4 = 0 (27)
where hi and gi are functions of ~ Q.
We solve numerically for the roots of the third and fourth order polynomials
(26) and (27). The polynomials represent two schedules that map a given ~ Q into
v, with possibly multiple solutions. We plot these two schedules in a ( ~ Q, v) space
with each intersection representing an equilibrium combination of ~ Q and v. ~ V ,
and therefore V , then follow from (25).
For a given process for St a typical parameterization gives 4 equilibria. This is
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for respectively m = 0 and m = 1. Schedule (26) is
represented by the solid line and (27) by the broken line. When m = 0 the variable
St is a pure sunspot. Figure 1 shows that there is one fundamental equilibrium
where v = V = 0. The other three equilibria are all sunspot equilibria. The
fact that for a given process for St there are now three sunspot equilibria rather
than the single sunspot equilibrium we found before is a result of the non-linearity
generated by the time-varying interest rate.
In Figure 2, where m = 1, St is a fundamental that drives the asset payo￿s.
There are again 4 equilibria. Equilibrium 1 is a pure fundamental equilibrium.
As we let m ! 0, it converges to Equilibrium 1 in Figure 1 where v = V =
0. The other three equilibria are all sunspot-like equilibria. As we let m !
0, they converge to the corresponding sunspot equilibria in Figure 1. Figure 3
illustrates the convergence of the sunspot-like Equilibrium 2 of Figure 2 to the
sunspot Equilibrium 2 of Figure 1 when m goes to zero. It is remarkable that even
when we get far away from m = 0, ~ Q, v and V change very little, especially in
11comparison to the near-zero levels of v and V in the fundamental equilibrium. This
suggests that even when the fundamental role of St is important, the impact of St
on the asset price is dominated by shifts in beliefs about risk that are unrelated to
this fundamental role.
3 Risk Panics
3.1 Switching across states
Risk panics can happen in equilibria that allow for a switch between low and high
risk states. In the previous section the economy was either in a fundamental or a
sunspot-like equilibrium. We now consider an equilibrium that allows for switches
between a low risk state (indexed by 1, akin to the fundamental equilibrium) and
a high risk state (indexed by 2, akin to the sunspot equilibrium). Switching occurs
through an exogenous Markov process. The probability that we remain in a low
risk state next period when we are in a low risk state today is p1 > 0:5. Similarly,
the probability that we remain in a high risk state next period when we are in a
high risk state today is p2 > 0:5.15
Equilibria 1 and 2 in Figure 2 are the points to which the low and high risk
states converge, respectively, in the limit where switching is not possible (p1 =
p2 ! 1). When switching is possible, the low risk state becomes riskier than
the pure fundamental Equilibrium 1 in Figure 2. This is because there is now a
possibility of switching to the high risk state, a switch that implies a signi￿cant
drop in the equity price. Even when the probability of switching is low, the main
source of uncertainty in the low risk state becomes the possibility of a jump to
the high risk state rather than the pure fundamental uncertainty in Equilibrium 1
of Figure 2.16 Agents take the possibility of switching into account when forming
their expectations.
15It may be realistic to allow these probabilities to depend on the state variable itself. For
example, a switch to the high risk state may be more likely when the fundamental is weak. Here
we abstract from that possibility and only consider the simpler case of constant probabilities of
switching.
16This is similar to what is found in the \rare disaster" literature (e.g., Barro, 2006, Gabaix,
2008) where a small probability of a large disaster a￿ects what happens in the no disaster periods.
12We conjecture that the log equity price in state i is
qi;t = ~ qi + viSt ￿ ViS
2
t (28)
As there are two such equations we solve for 6 unknown parameters (3 for each
state). This is done by imposing equity market equilibrium as before, but sepa-
rately for both states. We compute the expectation and variance of Qt+1 taking
into account that a switch to a di￿erent state is possible. The algebra is presented
in Appendix B.
As an illustration, Figure 4 shows the values of ~ Qi, vi and Vi in the low and
high risk states for the case where p1 = p2. As pointed out above, the two states
correspond exactly to Equilibria 1 and 2 of Figure 2 when p1 = p2 = 1. Switching
equilibria only exist when the probability of remaining in the same state is high
enough. But when p1 = p2 is higher than this cuto￿ (su￿ciently low probability
of switching), the di￿erence between the two states quickly becomes very big. A
lower probability of switching particularly reduces risk in the low risk state (lower
values of v and V ).
A risk panic is a switch from the low to the high risk state. It involves a
self-ful￿lling shift in beliefs about the process of risk. For example, when p1 = p2
are close to 1, there is a self-ful￿lling shift in beliefs about risk from the low and
constant risk in the fundamental equilibrium to the high and time-varying risk in
the sunspot-like equilibrium. Apart from the spike in risk, the panic also entails
an increase in the volatility of risk, a sharp drop in the equity price and a shift out
of equity (i.e. deleveraging when investors initially hold leveraged portfolios). We
graphically illustrate these e￿ects in Section 4 in an application to the 2007-2008
￿nancial crisis.
3.2 Panics and fundamentals
It is important to be clear both about the role that fundamentals do and do not
play in a risk panic. First, a panic is not caused by a change in fundamentals.
It happens for a given level of St. Second, the magnitude of the panic is larger
the weaker the fundamental (the more negative St). Finally, once a panic occurs
the asset price becomes much more sensitive to subsequent ￿uctuations in the
fundamental. The market becomes on edge regarding any news about St.
13Consider the ￿rst point: a panic does not result from a change in the funda-
mental. As can be seen from Figure 4, during the switch to the high risk state
the coe￿cients v and V increase, generally by a large magnitude. This a￿ects
risk and the asset price for a given level of St. What changes is not St itself but
rather the role it plays. As we switch to the high risk state, St suddenly becomes
a key variable around which agents coordinate their perceptions of risk. There is
a sudden self-ful￿lling increase in beliefs about risk, with the variable St being the
focal point for the change in risk perceptions.17
Notice that a risk panic is therefore conceptually distinct from ￿nancial acceler-
ator models where the impact of shocks is magni￿ed through ￿nancial constraints.
While small shocks have a large e￿ect in such models, the mechanism at work is
a purely fundamental mechanism. Our framework instead puts the coordination
of beliefs about risk center stage. During the panic, asset prices and risk move
sharply even though the state variable does not change.
Next consider the second point: the magnitude of the panic is larger the weaker
the fundamental. To illustrate this point, consider the change in the equity price
from the low to the high risk state. From (28) it follows that the change in the log
equity price is
q2;t ￿ q1;t = ~ q2 ￿ ~ q1 + (v2 ￿ v1)St ￿ (V2 ￿ V1)S
2
t < 0
Since v2 ￿ v1 and V2 ￿ V1 are both positive (see Figure 4), the drop in the equity
price is larger the more negative is St (i.e. the weaker the fundamental). Consider
for instance p1 = p2 = 0:65. In that case a panic lowers the equity price by
only 13% when St = 0, but by 65% when St is two standard deviations below its
unconditional mean of 0.
In this light a large risk panic can also be viewed as a delayed ampli￿cation ef-
fect. Consider a deterioration of the fundamental (a drop in St) when the economy
is in the low risk state. The shock lowers the equity price through the standard
fundamental mechanism, but this impact is relatively small. The delayed am-
pli￿cation e￿ect occurs if at some later date there is a switch to the high risk
equilibrium. At that point, the sunspot role of St suddenly surges. The impact of
17Even in the low risk state St plays to some extent a sunspot role if p1 < 1. But this role
is generally much stronger in the high risk state. In the low-risk state this role only re￿ects the
possibility of switching to the high risk state.
14the panic on the asset price is much larger than the fundamental impact of St in
the ￿rst stage. We will further illustrate this point in Section 4 in the context of
the recent ￿nancial crisis.
Finally consider the last role of the fundamental in a panic: once a panic
occurs the asset price becomes much more sensitive to subsequent ￿uctuations
in the fundamental. Once we switch to the high risk state, the fundamental St
becomes the focal point around which investors coordinate their beliefs about
risk. This causes them to react strongly to any change in the variable. A further
deterioration can lead to a signi￿cant further drop in the equity price. Conversely,
an improvement in the fundamental becomes a signi￿cant stabilizing force. In the
example above with p1 = p2 = 0:65, the equity price drops from 100 to 35 during a
panic when the fundamental is two standard deviations below its mean. But when
the fundamental reverts to it mean, the equity price goes all the way back to 87,
even though we are still in the high risk state.
4 Application to 2007-2008 Financial Crisis
This section uses our setting to shed light on what happened in the equity market
during the 2007-2008 ￿nancial crisis. We ￿rst discuss some basic ￿nancial data
associated with the dynamics of risk, leverage, liquidity and equity prices. After
that we slightly alter the model to make it more relevant to the crisis by introducing
shocks to the wealth of leveraged investors (think of mortgage market losses).
We then present a simulation and show that the outcome is qualitatively similar
to what happened during the crisis. We ￿nish by brie￿y discussing a variety of
sensitivity analyses.
As emphasized in the introduction, there are many aspects of the recent crisis
that are well beyond the scope of this paper. To the extent that our model is
applicable in shedding light on the crisis, it is primarily in the context of the
self-ful￿lling shifts in risk perceptions that are the focus of this paper. This key
mechanism applies beyond the particular episode of the 2007-2008 crisis, so this
section is only an illustration.
154.1 Dynamics of Risk, Leverage, Liquidity, and Asset Prices
The crisis came in the form of a one-two punch. The ￿rst part is the relatively
calm period from the beginning of 2007 until September 2008. The second part is
the ￿nancial panic that started in September 2008. The panic peaked by the end
of 2008 and it took several quarters for the situation to return to a more normal
state. Using data for the United States, we focus on the following variables: (1)
stock prices, (2) T-bill rate, (3) equity price risk, (4) volatility of risk, (5) net worth
of leveraged institutions, (6) leverage, and (7) market liquidity. A description of
the data and data sources can be found in Appendix C.
The dynamics of these variables during the crisis are illustrated in Figure 5.
The vertical line represents the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15,
2008, which we consider to be the start of the ￿nancial panic. After a modest
decline in stock prices and a small increase in risk during the tranquil period of
the crisis, stock prices suddenly crashed and risk spiked in September 2008. The
volatility of risk also shot up, while it showed no trend in the ￿rst stage. A ￿ight to
quality lowered the T-bill rate to near zero. Net worth gradually declined after mid
2007 until the third quarter of 2008, to quickly recover after the crisis. Financial
leverage ￿rst rose signi￿cantly during the tranquil period, and then fell sharply
during the panic stage. Finally, liquidity fell modestly during the tranquil part of
the crisis, followed by a sharp drop in liquidity during the panic and then a return
back to normal by mid-2009.
4.2 Model with Financial Shocks
In applying the model to the recent crisis we introduce ￿nancial shocks that redis-
tribute wealth between households and investors. These shocks ￿t more closely the
storyline of the 2007-2008 ￿nancial crisis where ￿nancial institutions experienced
large negative shocks to their wealth (net worth) connected to mortgage market
losses. We introduce shocks to the wealth of investors as follows:
WI;t = e
￿m￿t￿0:5m2￿2
t ￿ WI (29)
where




t+1 is a shock with mean zero and variance ￿2
￿.
16Equation (29) ensures that investors’ wealth is linear in ￿t up to a quadratic ap-
proximation: WI;t = ￿ WI(1￿m￿t). A rise in ￿t implies a drop in the relative wealth
of investors. Financial shocks redistribute wealth and leave aggregate wealth un-
changed (WI;t + WH;t = W), although in sensitivity analysis we ￿nd that results
are similar when there are shocks to the wealth of investors only. We assume that
￿nancial shocks ￿￿
t+1 and asset payo￿s At+1 are uncorrelated. Finally, we assume
that asset payo￿ shocks have no persistence (￿ = 0). This simpli￿es as the wealth
of investors is then the only state variable. The solution method is analogous to
that for the asset payo￿ shocks and can be found in the Technical Appendix. There
are again 4 equilibria, similar to those in Figure 2.
These wealth shocks also introduce links in the model between wealth, ￿nancial
leverage, risk and market liquidity. For example, lower wealth of investors reduces
market liquidity, which implies increased risk. Similarly, higher risk reduces ￿nan-
cial leverage, which lowers market liquidity and increases risk further. We refer
to a previous version of this paper for a more detailed discussion of these links,18
which have been extensively discussed in the literature.19
While we have changed the nature of the state variable in the model in order to
make it more applicable to what happened in 2007-2008, we should emphasize that
the exact nature of the fundamental is not so important. The key point is that a
large risk panic can develop when there is a self-ful￿lling shift in beliefs coordinated
around a very weak fundamental. The exact nature of the fundamental does not
matter much in this regard.
4.3 Model Simulation
We illustrate the dynamics of the variables in the model, and relate them to the
recent crisis, using the two-state switching equilibrium as described in Section 3.
The key point of this section is that large movements in asset prices and risk
require both a risk panic and a weak fundamental, with either having little impact
on its own. The parameters are shown at the bottom of Figure 6. The main
results are robust to the precise parameter values chosen, as discussed below. We
18See NBER working paper 16159.
19See Adrian and Shin (2008), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2010), Gromb and Vayanos (2008), He and Krishnamurthy (2008a, b), Kyle and Xiong (2001)
and Xiong (2001).
17set p1 = 0:95 and p2 = 0:7. This ensures that the high risk state occurs much less
frequently than the low risk state, as the economy spends only 14% of the time in
the high risk state. Panics of a large magnitude are even less frequent because they
require not only a switch to the high risk state but also a very weak fundamental.
The parameterization is chosen to make sure that investors are substantially
leveraged. Investors’ initial equity holdings are four times their net worth (wealth),
and are ￿nanced by borrowing from households through bonds. High leverage is
characteristic of most ￿nancial institutions. We therefore also refer to the investors
as leveraged ￿nancial institutions.
We simulate the model over 16 periods, which we interpret as quarters. We
do no make any attempt to match the process of ￿nancial losses in the data, but
instead illustrate the drivers of the model through a simple step function for ￿t,
along with a simple switching between low and high risk states. The dynamics of
￿t are illustrated through the wealth of investors, which follows the same path, in
the upper left chart of Figure 6. The economy is initially in a low risk state with ￿t
at its unconditional mean of zero. ￿t rises from 0 to 0.3 in period 2, which we can
think of as Q1 2007 when the losses of leveraged institutions on mortgage securities
became apparent, leading to a reduction of their wealth. This situation lasts until
period 8, which we can think of as Q3 2008, where the economy switches to the
high risk state. It stays in that situation until period 11 (Q2 2009) when ￿t falls
back to zero thanks, for example, to a recapitalization of leveraged institutions.
The economy reverts back to the low risk state in period 14 (Q1 2010).
These dates are not meant to match the exact length of the panic or the period
of ￿nancial weakness of leveraged ￿nancial institutions. Our focus is instead to
highlight the separate roles of the ￿nancial health of leveraged institutions and
the speci￿c risk state. This is done by considering all possible combinations of
￿nancial health (normal versus bad) and the state (low risk, high risk) in order to
evaluate the speci￿c contribution of both elements.
The simulation is presented in Figure 6. Periods during which ￿t changes are
marked by vertical dotted lines, while the shaded area denotes the time spent in the
high risk state. The wealth of investors follows the overall pattern seen in the data
for brokers and dealers in Figure 5, although the deterioration of the net worth
of ￿nancial institutions was obviously more gradual in the data. The other panels
show the paths of the equity price, risk, the volatility of risk, interest rate, leverage
18and illiquidity. The stock price (normalized at 100 initially) and gross interest rate
are Qt and Rt+1. Risk is measured as the standard deviation of Qt+1=Qt, taking
into account the possibility of switching to another state. The volatility of risk is
the standard deviation at time t of our risk measure at t + 1.20 Leverage is equal
to the share of equity in investors’ portfolio, ￿t. Finally, illiquidity is measured as
the absolute value of the derivative of the log equity price with respect to ￿t.21
During the tranquil part of the crisis the shift in wealth away from leveraged
￿nancial institutions reduces demand for equity and therefore its price. It also leads
to a decline in liquidity as less money is on the line in the equity market. The drop
in liquidity increases risk somewhat. Nonetheless Figure 6 shows that these e￿ects
are all modest. The only large change is leverage, which almost doubles. While
the small increase in risk reduces leverage, this is more than o￿set by an increase
in the expected excess return due to the lower equity price.22
The second stage of the crisis, when the economy shifts into the high-risk stage,
is characterized by a surge in risk and its volatility. This prompts a sharp reduction
in the equity price and leverage. The drop in leverage in turn dries up liquidity
in the equity market as investors reduces their exposure to equity. The switch to
bonds leads to a sharp drop in the interest rate.
The key message to take away from Figure 6 is that a large surge in risk
requires two ingredients, either one of which alone is not su￿cient. First, there
needs to be a self-ful￿lling risk panic (switch to the high risk state). Second, the
fundamental around which the market perceptions of risk coalesce (in this case the
net worth of leveraged institutions) must be weak. A deterioration of the macro
fundamental alone is not enough to generate a surge in risk. Even though the
net worth of leveraged institutions drops by more than 50% during the ￿rst stage
of the crisis, risk remains relatively modest. A switch to the high risk state by
itself is not enough either. Risk is restored slightly below its pre-panic level in
period 11, when we are still in the high risk state but the leveraged institutions
20In computing the volatility of risk, we assume that we remain in the same state the next
period. This makes it more consistent with the data, where it is measured as the volatility of
risk over the past 30 days, which usually captures volatility within the same state.
21This connects well to the illiquidity measure used in the data, which is also meant to capture
the price impact of asset demand shocks. See Appendix C.
22The model does not account for the drop in the interest rate prior to the panic as that is
largely related to monetary policy.
19are recapitalized.
While the simple exercise we have conducted here is not meant to match precise
data, the overall pattern in these variables is broadly in line with the data in Figure
5. During the pre-panic state of the crisis the impact on the equity price, risk and
liquidity is quite modest in both the data and the model. The substantial increase
in ￿nancial leverage during this period is also consistent with the model. Then,
during the switch to the panic state the model accounts for the sharp drop in the
equity price, ￿nancial leverage, and market liquidity and the sharp increase in risk.
The volatility of risk also behaves similarly to that in the data. It surges
together with risk during the panic and later on declines with the fall in risk itself.
This joint behavior of risk and the volatility of risk is a critical element of the
model, as discussed in Section 2.1. Risk spikes in the model only because future
risk becomes more uncertain.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Self-ful￿lling shifts in risk can occur as long as the asset price is negatively a￿ected
by risk about the future asset price. One might therefore expect the ￿ndings in
the simulation above to apply much more broadly than for the particular model
assumptions and parameterization underlying Figure 6. We con￿rm this through
a variety of sensitivity analysis that we summarize here, with the details given in
the Technical Appendix.
We ￿rst check that the results in the simulation exercise presented in Figure
6 are robust to alternative parameter values. This is done by halving and dou-
bling most parameters. The results remain qualitatively intact for all alternative
parametrizations. In particular, a risk panic leads to a sharp increase in risk and
the volatility of risk, and a large decrease in the equity price, market liquidity and
leverage. The precise magnitudes are certainly sensitive to parameterization. In
particular, the size of the risk panic is larger the smaller ￿, ￿￿, ￿, and m and the
larger ￿ ￿ W.
Second, we assess how the speci￿cs of the model a￿ect the results. We have
already seen that the nature of the fundamental around which risk panics are
coordinated is not critical to the results, as shocks to asset payo￿s also lead to
multiple equilibria and risk panics. Another modeling aspect is the assumption
20that ￿nancial shocks redistribute wealth between investors and households, with
no aggregate loss. We consider an alternative where the wealth loss for investors
is not o￿set by a gain for households and ￿nd that the results remain very similar.
Lastly, we abstracted from any feedback of the asset price to wealth. We include
this aspect in our OLG setting by assuming that some of the endowment when
born consists of trees. This ampli￿es the risk panic. For example, when 29% of
the wealth is subject to asset price shocks (in the low risk state at ￿t = 0), we ￿nd
that the feedback e￿ect from the asset price to wealth increases the magnitude of
risk panics, with risk spiking from 26% during the tranquil part of the crisis all
the way to 129% at the height of the panic.
Finally, we check the robustness with respect to the approximation in the so-
lution method. This is done by considering a cubic approximation of the market
clearing condition instead of a quadratic one. The simulation results are not sub-
stantially a￿ected, providing con￿dence that the precision of the approximation
method is not critical to the results.
5 Conclusion
Motivated by several recent crises that have shown very large spikes in risk without
correspondingly large shifts in fundamentals, we develop a theory for self-ful￿lling
shifts in risk. These shifts can occur when the asset price depends negatively on
perceived risk about the future asset price. Risk associated with tomorrow’s asset
price then depends on uncertainty about risk tomorrow. This dynamic mapping
of risk into itself gives rise to the possibility of self-ful￿lling shifts in risk.
Although a risk panic occurs without any change in fundamentals, it has a
larger impact the weaker the macro fundamental on which agents coordinate their
perceptions of risk at the time of the panic. The sharp increase in risk and ac-
companying volatility of risk in turn give rise to a large drop in the asset price,
decreased leverage and reduced market liquidity. While the model is not intended
to capture the events of any particular crisis episode, we have shown that the
implications of the model are nonetheless broadly consistent with what happened
during the 2007-2008 ￿nancial crisis.
Our ￿ndings open up several directions for future research. First, the equilibria
that we have identi￿ed can be found in any model where the actions of agents
21depend on the risk of an endogenous variable. While we have focused on asset
markets, the same may be the case for example in goods and labor markets. The
issue is also not limited to prices. We could replace Q with any other variable that
depends on risk associated with its future level. This could for example be output.
It is well-known that reduced uncertainty about the future economic environment
is good for business today (e.g. see Bloom, 2009).
Another direction for future research is to consider multiple assets. In our en-
tire analysis there is only one risky asset. This should therefore be interpreted
as the market portfolio of risky assets, which could be a country-wide or even a
global equity index. A natural question is what the implications are for stocks of
individual ￿rms. Closely related, in an open economy context one would like to
know whether all countries will be a￿ected by a risk panic or whether it could be
contained to a limited number of countries. This question relates to the widely dis-
cussed issue of ￿nancial contagion and is analyzed in Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2010).
A ￿nal direction for further research pertains to ￿nancial crises. We have kept
the model as simple as possible to focus on the role of self-ful￿lling shifts in per-
ceived risk. A natural question is how this interacts with other elements that we
have ignored. A non-exhaustive list includes ￿nancial constraints on leveraged
institutions (borrowing constraints, value at risk constraints), bank runs, and the
interaction between the ￿nancial crisis and real economic activity. Moreover, a
crucial issue is the policy recommendation that arises from our analysis. In Bac-
chetta et al. (2010) we examine the role of leveraged institutions in the context
of our model. We ￿nd that, despite their stabilizing role in normal times, less risk
averse leveraged institutions increase the magnitude of risk panics. We conclude
that a policy making ￿nancial institutions more risk averse, or more prudent, could
substantially reduce volatility.
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A Numerical Solution of Model in Section 2.5
In this Appendix we describe the solution of the equilibria in the version of the
model in Section 2.5. We take a quadratic approximation of the market clearing
condition around St = 0. Before doing so, we ￿rst need to compute the expectation
and variance of Qt+1 + At+1. From the conjecture (23) we have
Qt = ~ Qe
vSt￿V S2
t (31)
where ~ Q = e~ q. A quadratic approximation around St = 0 gives




For consistency we now also model the asset payo￿ in logs: ln(At) = ln( ￿ A)+mSt￿
0:5m2S2
t. This speci￿cation implies that a quadratic approximation of At around
St = 0 is At = ￿ A(1+mSt). Using these quadratic approximations of Qt and At at
t + 1 and then substituting St+1 = ￿St + ￿t+1 gives
Et(Qt+1 + At+1) = ~ Q
￿








￿ A + m ￿ A￿St (33)
var(Qt+1 + At+1) = ~ Q
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2 + 2 ~ Q ￿ A
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Here we have simpli￿ed slightly by adopting approximation ￿2
t+1 = ￿2 or var(￿2
t+1) =
0. This holds exactly in a simple distribution where ￿t can only take on the val-
ues ￿￿ and +￿. More generally, it is frequently adopted as a continuous time
approximation. Under a normal distribution the variance of ￿2
t+1 is 2￿4, which is
a small fourth-order term. Dropping this small term makes it easier to represent
the equilibria graphically.
Substituting these results into the market clearing condition (22) and taking a
quadratic approximation around St = 0 gives an equation of the form (24). Setting
the coe￿cients Z0, Z1 and Z2 equal to zero, we obtain respectively
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Here we de￿ne ￿ W = WI=￿.
The strategy is as follows. For a given value of ~ Q we ￿rst solve ~ QV from (35)
as a quadratic function of v. We substitute the result in (36) and (37). This
gives respectively a third and fourth order polynomial in v that needs to be solved
numerically. This leads to two schedules that map ~ Q into v (possibly multiple
values of v) that can be graphed. Equilibria are the points where these schedules
intersect.
From (35) we can solve
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￿











2K ~ Q ￿ Am
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From (36) we have
￿1 + ￿2v + ￿3v
2 + ￿4v
3 + ￿5[ ~ QV ] + ￿6[ ~ QV ]v = 0 (42)
where
￿1 = ￿ W ￿ A￿m (43)











￿3 = ￿2K ~ Q ￿ A￿￿
2m (45)
￿4 = ￿2K ~ Q
2￿￿
2 (46)
￿5 = 4K ￿ A￿￿
2m (47)
￿6 = 4K ~ Q￿￿
2 (48)
24Finally, (37) can be written as
￿1v + ￿2v
2 + ￿3v
4 + ￿4[ ~ QV ] + ￿5[ ~ QV ]
2 + ￿6[ ~ QV ]v
2 = 0 (49)
where
￿1 = 0 (50)
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1
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2 ￿ WK ~ Q
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￿6 = 4K ~ Q￿
2￿
2 (55)
Substituting (38) into (42), we have
h1 + h2v + h3v
2 + h4v
3 = 0 (56)
where
h1 = ￿1 + ￿5￿1 (57)
h2 = ￿2 + ￿6￿1 + ￿5￿2 (58)
h3 = ￿3 + ￿5￿3 + ￿6￿2 (59)
h4 = ￿4 + ￿6￿3 (60)
Substituting (38) into (49), we have
g1 + g2v + g3v
2 + g4v
3 + g5v
4 = 0 (61)
where
g1 = ￿4￿1 + ￿5￿
2
1 (62)
g2 = ￿1 + ￿4￿2 + 2￿5￿1￿2 (63)
g3 = ￿2 + ￿4￿3 + 2￿5￿1￿3 + ￿6￿1 + ￿5￿
2
2 (64)
g4 = 2￿5￿2￿3 + ￿6￿2 (65)
g5 = ￿3 + ￿5￿
2
3 + ￿6￿3 (66)
25Equations (56) and (61) are third and fourth order polynomials that we solve
numerically. The solutions map ~ Q into v. There may be multiple solutions (mul-
tiple v for a given ~ Q). We then plot these two schedules in a space with v on the
vertical axis and ~ Q on the horizontal axis, as in Figures 1-2. There is an equi-
librium when the two schedules intersect. The precise equilibria can be found by
solving (35)-(37) numerically in Gauss as a ￿xed point problem in v, V and ~ Q.
We choose starting values that are close to the equilibria found through visual in-
spection of where the two schedules intersect. Visual inspection gives approximate
values for ~ Q and v. The corresponding value for V follows from (38).
B Solving the Switching Equilibria
We now consider the equilibria in Section 3.1 of the paper where we allow for a
switch between a low and high risk state. p1 (p2) is the probability that next period
we will be in the low (high) risk state when this period we are in the low (high)
risk state. The log equity prices in the low and high risk states are
q
low risk





t = ~ q2 + v2St ￿ V2S
2
t (68)
Assume that currently we are in the low risk state at time t. Analogous to (33),
the expectation of Qt+1 +At+1, conditional on being in a low risk state in t+1, is
Et+1(Qt+1 + At+1jt + 1 is low) = a1;low + a2;lowSt + a3;lowS
2
t
where a1;low = ~ Q1(1 + !1￿2) + ￿ A, a2;low = ~ Q1v1￿ + m ￿ A￿, a3;low = ~ Q1!1￿2 and
!1 = ￿V1 + 0:5v2
1. Similarly, the expectation of Qt+1 + At+1 conditional on being
in the high risk state at t + 1 is
Et+1(Qt+1 + At+1jt + 1 is high) = a1;high + a2;highSt + a3;highS
2
t
where a1;high = ~ Q2(1 + !2￿2) + ￿ A, a2;high = ~ Q2v2￿ + m ￿ A￿, a3;high = ~ Q2!2￿2 and
!2 = ￿V2 + 0:5v2
2.
The expectation of Qt+1 + At+1 is then
Et(Qt+1 + At+1)
= p1Et+1(Qt+1 + At+1jt + 1 is low) + (1 ￿ p1)Et+1(Qt+1 + At+1jt + 1 is high)
= d1;low + d2;lowSt + d3;lowS
2
t (69)
26where di;low = p1ai;low + (1 ￿ p1)ai;high, i = 1;2;3.
The variance of Qt+1 + At+1 is
var(Qt+1 + At+1) = Et(Qt+1 + At+1)
2 ￿ (Et(Qt+1 + At+1))
2 (70)









Next consider Et(Qt+1 + At+1)2. Conditional on being in a low risk state at
t + 1, we have
Qt+1 + At+1 = a1;low + a2;lowSt + a3;lowS
2
t + a4;low￿t+1 (72)
where a4;low = ~ Q1(v1 + !12￿St) + m ￿ A. Using the de￿nition of a4;low, we then have
Et((Qt+1 + At+1)
2jt + 1 is low) = b1;low + b2St;low + b3S
2
t;low (73)
where b1;low = a2
1;low+( ~ Q1v1+m ￿ A)2￿2, b2;low = 2a1;lowa2;low+4 ~ Q1( ~ Q1v1+m ￿ A)!1￿￿2,
and b3;low = a2
2;low +2a1;lowa3;low +4 ~ Q2
1!2
1￿2￿2. Similarly, conditional on being in a
high risk state at t + 1 we have
Et((Qt+1 + At+1)
2jt + 1 is high) = b1;high + b2;highSt + b3;highS
2
t (74)
Here bi;high (i = 1;2;3) is de￿ned analogously to bi;low with subscripts low replaced
by high and subscripts 1 for ~ Q, v and ! replaced by 2. This implies that in the
low risk state at t:
Et(Qt+1 + At+1)
2 = c1;low + c2;lowSt + c3;lowS
2
t (75)
where ci;low = p1bi;low + (1 ￿ p1)bi;high, i = 1;2;3.
It follows that
















Finally, a quadratic approximation around St = 0 of QtRt+1 gives
QtRt+1 = e1;low + e2;lowSt + e3;lowS
2
t (77)
27where e1;low = 1
￿
h
(￿ ￿ W) + K ~ Q1
i
~ Q1, e2;low = 1
￿
h










Substituting these results into the market equilibrium condition (22), and tak-
ing a second order approximation around St = 0, again gives (24). Setting Z0 = 0,
Z1 = 0 and Z2 = 0 gives respectively
￿ W(d1;low ￿ e1;low) = K(c1;low ￿ d
2
1;low) (78)
￿ W(d2;low ￿ e2;low) = K(c2;low ￿ 2d1;lowd2;low) (79)
￿ W(d3;low ￿ e3;low) = K(c3;low ￿ d
2
2;low ￿ 2d1;lowd3;low) (80)
All of this is conditional on being in the low risk state at t. We can similarly impose
market equilibrium conditional on being in the high risk state at t. De￿ne ci;high
and di;high (i = 1;2;3) the same as ci;low and di;low, with p1 replaced by 1￿p2. Also
de￿ne ei;high (i = 1;2;3) the same as ei;low, with the subscripts 1 for ~ Q, v, V and
! replaced by subscripts 2. Then imposing market clearing we get three equations
analogous to (78)-(80) with the subscripts low replaced by high. Solving these six
equations jointly gives the solutions for ~ Q1, ~ Q2, v1, v2, V1 and V2. This is done
numerically in Gauss, using as starting values the solutions for equilibria 1 and 2
without switching.
C Data Sources for Figure 5
The data presented in Figure 5 are constructed in the following way. Stock prices
are measured by the DJ U.S. total stock market index. Risk is measured as the
CBOE SPX volatility VIX index. Volatility of risk is the standard deviation of the
VIX index over the past 30 days. Net worth and leverage are based on U.S. brokers
and dealers as reported by the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds. For market liquid-
ity we construct a measure similar to Amihud (2002) which, of di￿erent market
liquidity measures, correlates the most with estimates of price impact computed
using very high-frequency data (see Goyenko et al., 2009). Starting with individual
stocks, we compute the average absolute daily stock price change over a month
per dollar of daily trading volume. This is then averaged over 100 stocks from the
S&P index. We are grateful to Giorgio Valente for providing us with the updated
measure. Holding period returns and volumes are from Reuters Datastream. To
28deal with stationarity, in the spirit of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) the illiquidity
measure is multiplied by the ratio of the aggregate volume for all stocks in the
sample at the end of a month to the same aggregate volume at the beginning of
the sample. A high value of our measure indicates low market liquidity. It is
therefore a measure of illiquidity.
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Source: Datastream, daily data. Stock prices are the DJ U.S. total market price index (January 1, 2007 = 100). The interest rate is the U.S. 3 month Treasury 
bill. The risk measure is the CBOE SPX volatility VIX index. The volatility of risk is the 30 days standard deviation of the VIX index.
Figure 5a Stock prices, interest rate, and risk
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Source: Data on brokers and dealers from the Fed’s Flow of Funds (L.129); net worth is assets minus liabilities, billion US $; leverage is net worth 
divided by assets. The illiquidity measure is an updated measure of Amihud (2002). The vertical lines represent Q3 2008 for the quarterly net worth 
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2009Figure 6 Model Simulation*
shaded area = high risk equilibrium; vertical lines = endowment shock
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* The economy starts in the low risk equilibrium. At time 2 the endowment of investors falls from 6 to 2.8. The economy stays in the low risk equilibrium     
until time 8, at which point is shifts to the high risk equilibrium. At time 11 endowments shift back towards the initial allocation. The economy remains in 
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